At the outset I would like to make clear the intent and scope of this essay. This paper is not an introduction to scientific or Hallachik methodology, on the contrary it is intended only for one who has given careful attention to the former and has immersed himself in the latter. My objective is to use a brief overview of scientific methodology and its advances as a comparative tool to clarify some fine points regarding the proper application of the methodology we commonly refer to as the Brisker Derech. Both of these topics are extremely broad and deep and can only be touched upon in a short paper but I hope that I have given enough that the intelligent reader will be able to think more deeply into the topic and see my points.
In the scientific method
every particular is viewed as an expression of a universal principle not as a
separate localized reality. An apple falling from a tree to the ground is not
an apple-ground phenomenon but an interaction between their underlying substances. We look for the simplest
explanations of the widest range of events, not for a complex patchwork of
explanations each fitting a single event. Thus explanations based on the
particulars of apple and earth are rejected in favor of explanations based on
the universal matter each possesses.
This method naturally leads to simpler principles that unify more and more
particular cases. As Einstein and Infeld state in the Evolution of Physics, (which is
an excellent book on the subject of scientific thought and methodology), “[The
scientist] certainly believes that, as his knowledge increases, his picture of reality
will become simpler and simpler and will explain a
wider and wider range of his sensuous impressions (P. 31).” Thus physics has
evolved from Aristotle’s
ideas of different types of motion to Galileo’s unified theory of motion, from
the idea of the existence of different weightless substances, namely, heat,
electricity (two kinds) and magnetism to a unified theory of energy. What is
the basis for this approach? It is the belief that all of the universe is
composed of fundamental building blocks under the influence of fundamental
forces with
all of the observable phenomena being their various expressions. It is this
search for what lies beneath that demands a universal law of nature, the law of
the fundamentals, with each advance striking deeper.
(The fact that all of this should
be intelligible to the human mind is another assumption of science worthy of
consideration but is beyond of the scope of this paper).
This
general belief is the basis for science, but each scientific era has its own
philosophy, a particular view regarding the overall nature of the universe (I
am using this term in the sense employed by Einstein and Infeld in The
Evolution of Physics). For instance, from Galileo through Newton the
prevailing philosophy was that of the existence of a purely mechanical
universe, the belief that, "All phenomena can be explained by the
action of forces representing either attraction or repulsion,
depending only upon distance and acting between unchangeable
particles (ibid.
p.
65).” These philosophical ideas are the most universal ideas; they are not
about particular elements of the universe but are about
the underlying nature of the universe or about what
type of universe we live in. Being the most universal ideas this philosophy of
science guides all further development and allows for only certain kinds of
theories. Given a mechanical view of reality only certain types of explanations
are acceptable; a quantum explanation would have no place in that philosophical
regime. This is true in every branch of science, from psychology to biology to
economics, the overall philosophical idea, be it Freudian, Darwinian or
Keynesian will guide and mold any particular theory. "Philosophical
generalizations must be founded on scientific results. Once formed and widely
accepted, however, they very often influence the further development of
scientific thought by indicating one of the many possible lines of procedure (ibid. p. 51).”
Breakthroughs are those theories that shift our thinking from the entrenched philosophy to a new one. This opens up new approaches to analyzing phenomena, avenues of inquiry previously unrealized, and indicates experiments not previously contemplated. It suggests new ways of looking at things and the unification of phenomena formerly regarded as distinct. It is a gate of knowledge, an opening to formerly hidden vistas and perspectives and the beginning of a new intellectual environment. At the heart of the breakthrough is the ability to look at events or phenomena that present problems under the prevailing view and recognize the possibility that another view might make things yet simpler. Thus we move from a particular case or set of problems to a breakthrough which in turn leads to new understanding about other particular cases and eventually to a new philosophy. “Successful revolt against the accepted view results in unexpected and completely different developments, becoming a source of new philosophical aspects (ibid p. 51)." This continues until problems reveal an inadequacy in the new philosophy and the process repeats.
Something interesting occurs
near the end of a philosophic regime. The idea that
was an intellectual boon to science at its inception, allowing for new freedoms
of thought, can become
in its decline an intellectual shackle forcing every phenomenon to conform to
its terms. To
the conventional thinkers it
is no
longer a tool of new insights and fresh ideas rather it becomes an ideology
of its own. The loyal rally around it and craft creative if not brilliant ways
of fitting the unruly phenomena into the old terms no matter how tenuous or far
fetched. Ironically, this is the opposite approach of the methodology that
spawned the very idea they are defending. Whereas the original breakthrough
started with a set of problems from which were derived a new universal,
this method starts with a universal and insist on
particular kinds
of solutions which are in
line with the
philosophy. Eventually a new
breakthrough is needed to once again reduce the complexity created.
The scientific process is one of moving from
the concrete to the abstract, from the particular to the universal, from a
strange chaotic world to a system of laws governing outcomes in a clearly
predictable way. Thus scientific thought attempts to relate particulars to
universals but the question is where do these universals stem from, or what is
the starting point in this process?
We could say that there are three types of relationships between the universal and the particular in scientific thought. First, the particular presents a genuine difficulty that defies a simple explanation under the existing theoretical framework and philosophy, such as difficulties regarding the speed of light in classical physics. This leads to a new theoretical framework which offers a natural explanation of the phenomenon. The ideas flow from the bottom up, from the particular phenomena to the universal. A fresh, unaffected look at the case suggests viewing it on its own terms and not with any preconceived notions, such as that of an absolute space and time. This is the breakthrough stage. Second, the new universal is used to explain other problems which were until now either unresolved or whose answers lacked simplicity. Fresh approaches and possibilities open up based on the new theory and a new philosophical view begins to develop. To the extent that this new approach offers simple solutions to a greater range of events and yields new discoveries its veracity is corroborated. This is a stage of tremendous growth in scientific knowledge where a new tool to probe the depths of the universe has been discovered and its limits are being tested. During this phase the revolutionary idea becomes clarified and strengthened and the philosophical shift is complete. Third, the new view has become an entrenched orthodoxy and is used as a basis to posit new realities in order to allow difficult cases to conform to the prevailing philosophy. This is a strict top down approach, one of taking the universal as fact and forcing every particular into its image. This approach does not look to see what unimaginable wonders might be hidden within the difficulties but rather tries to remove the problems with artful devices to fit with the old view. This is done by positing new substances, forces or phenomena that resolve the difficulty and preserve the framework at the price of positing otherwise unfounded realities. A brilliant example of this is the theory to support the view that heat is a substance in face of the problem that heat is apparently created by friction (unlike substances which are conserved, not created from nothing). The solution was that the heat substance is there all along but the rubbing changes the specific heat of the object, or the ability of the object to conduct heat, and it only feels hotter (ibid. p. 41). This view persisted until a crucial experiment showed no change in specific heat.
In
sum, the essence of the scientific methodology is to view the particulars as an
expression of universals. The breakthrough develops from a careful analysis of
the events themselves, free from preconceived notions, which leads to new
theories regarding the laws governing the events. This
is a fact oriented analysis honestly seeking clues from the phenomena
themselves, intellectually probing the depths in the hopes of finding the most
natural and fitting theory without regard to the prevailing conventions or
norms. If a theory is found that challenges accepted premises it must then be
tested in other areas to verify its truth, it must prove its usefulness by
simplifying the old and opening new discoveries unimaginable under the former
framework. It is not enough to merely be a restatement or more convenient
expression of the known it must demonstrate that a new deeper view of reality
has been uncovered. Einstein and
Infeld’s description of the development of the field theory illustrates this
point. “The concept of field can now be put to a much more severe test. We
shall soon see whether it is anything more than a new representation of the
acting force (ibid. p. 133).” The ability to describe certain known phenomena
more easily does not prove the validity or reality of the existence of a field
of force, further investigation was needed. After an experiment suggested by
the theory yielded positive results they continue, “We have the right to regard
the field as something much more than we did at first. The properties of the
field alone appear to be essential for the description of phenomena; the
differences in source do not matter. The concept of field reveals its
importance by leading to new experimental facts (ibid. p. 133-134).” Thus
we must start with the facts and follow the possibilities suggested by them in
the hope that a new approach can be developed that will lead to a more accurate
view of the universe, revealing truths which were previously hidden. It is the
creativity of the scientist that drives the development of science. “To raise
new questions, new possibilities, to regard old problems from a new angle,
requires creative imagination and marks real advance in science (ibid. p. 92).”
The creative scientist comes to the problem with an ability to view things from
fresh perspectives; he sees old phenomena in a brand new light, as indications
of new concepts that shatter the normative view. It is really a process of
starting over, of viewing the facts with an intellectual freedom to follow them
to their own logical outcome that produces the advances. The
opposite approach, to start with a view and a preconceived notion of the theory
you want, and then to posit ways for the events to conform to that theory leads to stagnation.
Since we employ a scientific
method in Hallachik analysis are there similarities in the relationship between
the universal and the particular in Hallachik thought? As in science there must
first be a basis for theoretical analysis. Part of the Brisker Derech is a
statement about the foundation of Hallachik analysis, an idea that Hallacha is
not a list of particulars, but a categorical system open to intellectual
analysis relating the particulars to universals. Each area of Hallacha has
its own unique character and philosophy (in the scientific sense) or
fundamental concepts of the Sugya which will guide the analysis. For example,
one would not expect Hallachik formulations in Nezikin to be like those in
Taharos, even though the methodology, or approach to understanding, is the
same. Additionally,
the three types of
relationships outlined
above have expression in Hallachik thought as well. First, the careful analysis of the
facts leads to a breakthrough
that uncovers
an underlying idea or universal in the Sugya; second, that leads to further
analysis of related issues explaining other problems, opening other
possibilities
and relating seemingly unrelated issues; and third, there are the forced
Sevaras of those desperate to save their overall theory in a Sugya.
But there are key differences in the nature of the systems of science and Hallacha. Science studies the universe we live in and looks to find the most fundamental causes of what exists. The world is not rocks and trees and stars but fundamental elements driven by fundamental forces. In short, science is the quest to find out what really exists and it assumes that all existences share a common fundamental. Hallachik analysis on the other hand studies the Torah, a system of laws and ideas with a specific purpose, that of perfection for mankind. In what way then are they similar? Although primarily a purpose driven system, purpose must ultimately resolve itself into structure; particular forms and materials must be selected to achieve the given purpose. Any system of purpose must ultimately put forth entities to carry out its goals, to give existence to it own ideas, and in a legal system, these must exist in an absolute and objective form without regard to the fulfillment of the given purpose. For instance, safety is the purpose of traffic laws but safety itself is not the law, rather with safety in mind a legislature selects specific rules regulating conduct, operators and equipment which must be obeyed at all times even if safety is not an issue in a particular case, as in the case of a red light in the middle of nowhere with no one around for miles. If laws only had to be kept when the individual thought it necessary then no system of law would exist. We see from this that while the purpose put forth the structure it is not the substance of the structure or part of the law; the structure exists even in its absence, and the law must be defined on its own terms, for instance in terms of what traffic signals, intersections and vehicles are, not in terms of what safety is. We see then that what the systems of science and Torah have in common is that they both contain entities of objective structures, one as the totality of the system and the other as a means with which to accomplish its purpose. It is in this secondary aspect of the system of Torah that the scientific method of analysis enters into the study of Torah.
This distinction has an important impact on the
two studies. The most basic difference is that while both
processes look for causes there are two causes to speak of in Hallacha - the
purpose or reason for its existence, and the way or form in which it exists. The
former has no counterpart in science and is not part of the scientific method.
There is a study of that in Torah but it is a speculative science not a Hallachik analysis and
has no part of the Brisker Derech. As was said before, Hallachik structures
must exist without regard to purpose, just like natural law, and any use of
purpose in its analysis is foolish. Aside for the fact that the purpose for
many Mitzvos is hidden from us, and yet there analysis is open to us, even if
we knew the purpose for sure, it would not be part of the analysis because the
purpose itself has no Hallachik form, it is the reason for the form (in fact one purpose could be met in many
different ways, there is no specific form demanded). This
is illustrated by the question of whether Mitzvos need Kavanah on the part of
the performer. The view that they do not means that even though the person had
no intention for the action of the Mitzva, much less the benefit of the Mitzva,
e.g., where he lifted a Lulav to
move it out of the way, he is none the less Yotzeh. If the
purpose was part of the Mitzvah this would not be possible. Even the side that
disagrees only requires Kavanah to do the action of the Mitzva in order
to relate the person to the action properly, that is why the Ran says in Rosh
Hashanah that eating Matzah does not require Kavana according to that Shita
because since
he is intrinsically related to the Mitzva through the enjoyment, he does
not need the Kavanah to relate him (see רב יוסף
דוב הלוי
סולוביציק
שעורים לזכר
אבא מרי ז"ל
כרך א דף מד). Therefore, structure and
purpose must be kept separated in terms of the analysis of Hallacha. It is true
that a Mitzva takes a form that is suitable to produce the desired result but
to say, for instance, that one is not Yotzeh Shema if he reads it mindlessly
because the purpose is קבלת עול
מלכות שמים
would be only very loosely true. קבלת
עול מלכות
שמים is not
the Mitzvah itself, if it were
the actual reading of the
Parsha would not be necessary, only an internal
acceptance.
Hallachikally he is not Yotzeh because this Mitzvah demands a certain kind of
Kriya, one with an accompanying mental action of cognition not just a physical
action of reading (even if you hold Mitzvos Lo Tzrichos Kavanah). Definitively
it could be said that the Reading of Shema is a reading to one's self and as
such needs the person to both verbalize or perform the act of reading and to be
מקבל the statement in his mind. This completes
the particular form of Kriya demanded by the Mitzva. This also could explain
the Kiyum of hearing what you say by Kriyas Shema as a full expression of that
activity. It is a specific form of reading selected by this Mitzvah that can be
structuraly defined without recourse to the reason. Naturally this formulation
is in line with achieving the purpose but to define the goal of קבלת
עול מלכות
שמים as the structure itself is shoddy, lazy and imprecise thinking. This deficiency is not
overcome by expanding the scope, by saying that an entire area of Hallacha is
ruled by a certain reason and trying to show how each Hallacha within it is
caused by this reason. This still is not a definition of the Hallachik structures
themselves and is a mistake of substituting purpose for structure. Furthermore,
even with a given purpose what is to say that every
Hallacha in the Inyan must be a manifestation of that purpose? It is entirely possible that
other, extraneous reasons are in play determining individual Hallachos. For
instance, in the Din of צרעת הבית the Cohen orders the resident to
empty the house before he checks for
the presence of צרעת. The Mishna explains that
this is because חס
התורה על ממון
ישראל, meaning
to say there is no reason in terms of נגעים for this interruption before
the Cohen checks the house but it comes from a general concept. The gemara in
Succah explains that the Lulav could not be a thorny branch because דרכיה
דרכי נועם. Thus
sometimes various reasons exert their own influence on the structure.
Furthermore, as Rambam says there will always be details
that are not related to any specific reason other than, for instance, that
there must be a number, to look for reason here he considers foolish. In truth
only after an exhaustive study and careful analysis of the Hallachik
structures, after we know what it is that we are dealing with, may we speculate
about the purpose. This is an intrinsic limitation of the Derech as a
tool of Hallachik explanation and any criticism
that the Derech does not incorporate טעמים into the definitions is akin
to complaining that the eye, while the most powerful tool we have to perceive
reality, does
not tell us
how something tastes. There is no
claim that Brisker Derech is the only method of studying Torah, only that it is
the methodology of Hallachik Analysis. To demand that it incorporate that which
is not part of Hallachik structure is a demand beyond the subject itself and could only result in a distortion of the
method. As stated in Chovos Halevavos and the Moreh
Hanevuchim, using any faculty in a way that it is not designed for destroys the
faculty itself, and in our case corrupts the methodology. Not only will those
ideas be unfounded but it will damage your ability to properly define in
general.
Another difference between the two systems is in how the structures relate to one another. The structures of the system of science are thought to be uniform in their most basic components which are the substantial causes, the real stuff of the universe. This is why science strives for a unified theory of everything. But is such a theory the goal of Hallachik analysis? Science, as the study of what is, looks for deeper causes of the manifest universe. Science has gone from atomic elements to subatomic particles to quarks and beyond, each step hoping to find the most fundamental building blocks of everything we see. The hope is to have a complete theory that explains all phenomena, showing that they are all different expressions of the same fundamentals. This is only possible because the universe is one existence and we assume that all existence has the same fundamental cause. Hallachik entities are not structures made up of smaller more fundamental universal entities, they are separate structures created by גזירת הכתוב, not natural expressions of fundamental existences. They exist owing to their utility and specific need. This is why in Hallacha each Inyan is like its own system with its own philosophy or types of Hallachik structures. Of course, all Hallachos unify into one system, but the unification is in terms of purpose, that they all work together for the same ultimate purpose, not in any fundamental existence underlying all Hallachik structures. This does not contradict the idea of a universal Derech. A Derech recognizes that there is an overall character to the system of Hallacha, that the entities are defined in certain ways and must take on certain kinds of forms. The idea that a Mitzvah can be formulated in terms of the גברא or חפצא is an idea about how or in what form Mitzvos exist.
Before we leave this topic
let me clarify what I mean by the Torah being unified in terms of purpose.
While there is an ultimate purpose in Torah, that does not mean that every
Halacha has the same purpose. Perfection is not a matter of repeating the same
thing in different ways. Each Mitzva has its own objective and together the
result of all of them is to lead a person to perfection (the Mitzvos not being
perfection itself). Each Mitzva has its own limited purpose which has a place
in reaching the ultimate goal. Many Mitzvos keep a person from harm, not impart
a perfection. This is a Derech Hashem that Rambam derives in the Morah from the
path Bnei Yisroel took from Mitzrayim. Hashem led them on an indirect route
because they would not be able to bear the challenges of the direct route.
Thus, sometimes a Mitzva can help avoid a pitfall on the road to perfection.
The Hallachik structure only implements the immediate purpose. For instance, one
cannot perfect himself if he is dead but the Mitzva of לא תעמד
על דם רעך is defined in terms of saving the person's life not helping him
perfect himself. (When
two lives are in danger a method of קדימה is employed to decide who is saved first. But this is based on
objective criteria of worth with regard to the system of Mitzva and to the
community, not the structure of the Mitzva itself. For instance, if one did not
follow קדימה the Isur
would be in violating קדימה not לא
תעמד על דם
רעך).
It is
important to note that even when there is a Hallachik purpose we can not
necessarily employ it in our Hallachik definitions. It is the manifest purpose
of the Mikdash to produce a Kiyum Avoda but in analyzing the particulars that
lead to a Kiyum Avoda we must look no further than the particulars themselves.
For instance the מזבח is Mikadesh even a Pasul Korban, one that can have no
Kiyum Avoda. If we were to define the מזבח only
as a tool of the ultimate purpose of a Kiyum Avoda then why would the מזבח be Mikadesh that which cannot fulfill the purpose? If the whole
purpose is to bring about a Kiyum Avoda and that is not possible with a Pasul
Korban, the מזבח should not act upon it. The proper definition is in terms of
the מזבח on its own terms, as a type of כלי שרת that performs a specific Hallachik function of being Mikadesh not
as a tool of Kiyum Avoda. There is a subtle but important difference. The
system of Mikdash generates many Hallachik entities, each with their own
limited definition, which, when used together properly can produce a Kiyum
Avoda. But since they are independent Hallachik entities they exist apart from
the overall purpose of Kiyum Avoda and this demands that the מזבח will be Mikadesh without regard for the ultimate goal of the
design. If the מזבח was only seen in terms of the objective of Kiyum Avoda it would
not exist as its own entity and would not be Mikadesh a Pasul. This is true in
any design, for example, an automobile is designed as a mode of transportation
utilizing its many components in an organized way, but the engine will turn
even if the wheels are broken.
Another difference is in the focus of the analysis. Whereas science is focused on finding the universal among the particulars and only values the particulars as means to the universal, Hallachik analysis is singularly concerned with the particular. The goal is always to know what the particular Mitzva is and what the Hallachik obligations are, not some generalized idea. The Hallachik analysis, therefore, is a more limited, local analysis than the scienctific. Additionally, since each Hallachik institution is the product of Gzayras Hakasuv and not a different permutation of some underlying existence, in other words, since each Hallachik institution has to a certain extent its own cause, the particulars must play a greater role. To be sure, there are universal entities and concepts in Hallacha like Mechitzos and Grama, but even then their particular applications are different owing to the nature of the subject. Thus the rules for using Mechitzos are different by Shabbos, Succah and Kilayim, and Grama by Nezikin is different from Grama by Shabbos. The Hallachik analysis focuses on the nature of Mechitza as it exists by Shabbos as opposed to Succah and Kilayim not on the universal Mechitzah. We seek to understand the unique requirements of each field to explain the different ideas of Mechitza by each. For instance, Kilayim only needs separation between the Minim and one Mechitza, an instrument of separation, is sufficent whereas the other two require a specific Makom. It is the new idea of Makom that demands the extra Machitzos to delineate it. Additionally, Shabbos only needs a separated Makom and a sloping hill is considered a unified Mechitza isolating the Makom, but Succah needs a structure of Mechitzos and a slope will not do (it is true that a Migu exists by Succah and Shabbos, correlating the Mechitzah for both but that is a separate Hallachik principle of Migu stating, in specific cases, that the same place is not both qualified and unqualified by Mechitzos at the same time. This does not change the fact that the Hallachos of how Mechitza qualifies the area are different for both). Of course, a knowledge of the idea of the universal is necessary since each particular is a species of it but we need it only to better understand our particular. In this sense the analyses are opposite, Science values the particular for the universal and the Brisker Derech goes to the universal in order to properly understand the particular. An interesting example of this is the process of going from an Av Melacha to a Tolada, as explained in the Perush Mishnayos of Rambam and in the Yad. The Av is the very activity done in the Mishkan, for instance making flour. To get to the Tolada we take the Av and ask what it is a particular of. In this case it is a particular form of breaking large bodies into smaller ones. This is the step of universalizing or abstracting from the particular. We then say wherever that general activity is used in a process other than the one of the Av it is a Tolada, in our case shaving gold to make gold dust. It is a process of abstracting from the particular to know what category it exists in and then identifying other members of its class. This is the universalizing of the Derech, finding what category a particular exists within to understand it better.
The main difference is in the exact process of moving from the particular to the universal. The physical world we see is only visible because a certain type of light is reflected to our eyes. This is a crude instrument and only a fool would think that it captures all physical existences. Science tries to go beyond the senses to understand what really exists. Thus the analysis leads from manifest objects to their smaller unseen parts, which are the more universal building blocks. These existences are probed by experiment and understood by theory. Hallacha is somewhat different; it is more a process of abstraction than looking for subcomponents. The Derech takes a particular of Halacha and asks what category it is a particular of, to what category does it owe its existence or what is the nature of its existence. The Derech states that Hallacha is not a catalog of particulars rather the particulars exist as representations of larger categories and it is these categories that we are in search of, exactly as we have done for Avos Melachos. Both are looking for the real existence beyond the particular but science looks for its substantial cause, what it is made up of, and the Derech looks for its qualitative cause, or definition, what kind of existence it really is. The greatness of Rav Chaim was not in his encyclopedic mastery of the facts, his בקיאות, which is not חכמה, nor in his tremendous creativity, which could lead to imaginative speculation, rather in his knowledge of Hallachik catagories and his ability to look at a problem and realize which catagories apply. This is a skill gained and an intuition honed from a realization of the nature of Hallachik formulation and an intimate familiarity with categorical thinking. With this approach he was able to utilize both his strengths of בקיאות and creativity to shine a powerful light on any subject and uncover the underlying Dinim or Hallachik catagories that the Sugya revolves around. For instance, when Rav Chaim said that according to the Rambam the Mitzva of זכירת יציאת מצרים is not a קיום בפני עצמו but is a קיום קבלת עול מלכות שמים of Kriyas Shema, he gave us a new way to look at both. Now זכירת יציאת מצרים is a particular of a greater activity of קבלת עול מלכות שמים and must be viewed according to that nature, furthermore the Mitzva of קבלת עול מלכות שמים is now shown to be given to different expressions, via the essential ideas of אחדות and through הזכרת יציאת מצרים וגאולת ישראל, which expresses Hashgachas Hashem over Klal Yisroel (see הרב יוסף דוב הלוי סולוביציק שעורים לזכר אבא מרי ז"ל כרך א דף יד). This is an idea that resolves the question of why Rambam does not count זכירת יציאת מצרים as a separate Mitzva with a careful definition which in turn sheds a new light on the whole Inyan of Kriyas Shema. It is through this process of definition, of understanding the nature and cause of a particular (in this case זכירת יציאת מצרים is a Din in and is caused by the Mitzva of קבלת עול מלכות שמים) that a Sugya opens up. This is not a restatement of facts but a careful analysis of the facts placing them in their proper setting.
Another
important distinction is in the development of the two systems. Science is
constantly discovering new facts of
which earlier thinkers were completely unaware. New ideas
are the hallmark of progress and no criticism can be lodged in exceeding the
knowledge of the past generations. But Hallacha was complete when it was given
and we have in fact lost knowledge over time. Thus our task is, as Rav Chaim
said, not to be מחדש but only to explain what
the Rishonim have said. This is
not a limitation on the process of analysis itself only a limitation on its
reach and a test of the validity of the results. It is not
possible, as the Rav said, for someone to say they have discovered a new Mitzva
that the גר"א did not know about. We must always look to the
Rishonim for a basis for what we say and be able
to demonstrate that our ideas are an explanation of what is said if we want to be sure that it is truly part of Torah. The hallmark of
the Derech is to only say what we can see from the facts, anything more being
speculation and not definition. An abstraction or definition is justified only when the facts demonstrate that the
particular is part of a category otherwise there is no right to posit such a
thing. An amazing example of this is in the area of טעם
כעיקר. The Gemara in Pesachim asks where the principle of טעם
כעיקר is found in Torah. The Gemara proposes that from בשר וחלב, where the Isur is both Minim
together and the milk is only present in the form of טעם, we should learn that where a substance (עיקר) is needed the presence of
its טעם is equivalent to the
presence of the substance. The Gemara says that we cannot learn from there
because the whole Isur is a חידוש and we cannot universalize
from a חידוש. But what is the חידוש? The Gemara says if it is
because they are both Heter and together make Isur, כלאים is the same and טעם
כעיקר should be learned. (The Gemara concludes the חידוש is that
it is only Asur through בישול but that
is not relevant for our
discussion). But
what does the fact that one other case exists help us to learn טעם
כעיקר in general, maybe they are both unique? The Gemara wants to universalize from the
particular of בשר
וחלב that טעם is like the עיקר, but in order to do that we must be able to say that בשר
וחלב is a type of Isur of two Heter Minim, and the milk is present in
the form of טעם, via a general principle.
If, however, this were the only case of Heter and Heter, there would be no justification for positing such a
category and all we could say is that בשר
וחלב is unique in all of its particularities; it is an Isur of flavored meat, not of two Heter entities
together. Only after establishing with כלאים that there is another case
of Heter and Heter is there justification to say that a category of Heter and
Heter exists, and only then can we say that the טעם is simply a universal method
of representing the Heter, and not a unique particular of the Isur בשר
וחלב itself. The method of abstraction requires the positing of a
category, but without Hallachik indications of that category there is no
justification in positing one. This is Occam's razor. Here unifying the two Isurim under one category is a
simplification of two particulars and justified, but to look at בשר
וחלב alone and deem it a particular of a category in order to derive
טעם
כעיקר is unjustified. In fact that would add complexity by creating a
category with only one member and adding a
principle of טעם
כעיקר. Unless we can
demonstrate that our idea is necessary to explain the facts it is nothing more
than speculation and conviction is unjustified. In fact, the sense of
conviction in these ideas is corruptive to the mind, confusing soft conjecture
with solid definition. A clear crisp definition may not be the final theory in
the Sugya but it will always be true, in so far as it is necessary and puts the
phenomena into categorical terms. Its significance may yet be unknown but it
may lay the groundwork for deeper ideas to expand our knowledge of the Din or
it may lay in wait for a breakthrough, maybe in a different area, which will
reveal its meaning. But if a speculative, unfounded idea is foisted upon us it
will remain as an end in itself closing off further analysis. This is the maxim
of Rav Chaim that you don't die from a question. Better to
leave a question open for another day than to force an answer and close it off
prematurely. Just as in science, the next breakthrough in Hallachah is to be
found in new ways of looking at intractable problems and progress is halted by
the hollow satisfaction of having given an answer. (Sometimes possibilities have to be tried in
order to see where they will lead and may start out speculative but lead to a
better understanding. These intermediary steps must be regarded for what they
are, and be abandoned if they do not pan out).
A word on beauty. One basic distinction in the studies of science and Hallacha is the manner of proof in each. Experimentation is at the heart of the scientific process and offers the possibility and very often the reality of crucial experiments that lay to waste whole hosts of erroneous theories while giving proper conviction in others. What sort of proof is offered in Hallacha? The Gemara investigates Hallachik positions by subjecting them to the facts (experiments) of Mishnayos and Braysos. But often a position cannot be refuted. In the absence of such refutation where does the Hallachik thinker turn to for his conviction? How does he select from the many possibilities? A much touted barometer is the beauty of the idea, and many scientists have spoken about the beauty of the theory as a source for their conviction. But we must ask why is beauty a mark of truth? Is this some coincidence or is there a logic behind it? Also, and most importantly, what do we mean by beauty, is all beauty the same or only certain beauty? Certainly a beautiful landscape or sunset is not more true than an ugly or plain one. The beauty of the idea that we are talking about is the beauty of simplification, of a unification that exhibits a deep wisdom. There is a wonder and appreciation in seeing that what lies behind the obvious and the apparent works with an elegant, unexpected simplicity and wisdom. It is the beauty of a system of simple principles that generates and unifies a complex set of phenomena that has attracted great minds as a mark of truth because this is in fact the objective of abstract thinking, to move from the many concrete particulars to their deeper causes. The beauty and joy is from finding exactly what one has been searching for in a clear yet surprising way. It is the beauty of order out of chaos, of realizing that unfounded notions had crept into our thinking, distorting and obscuring our view, creating apparent contradictions, inconsistencies and coincidences, and that their removal allows us to ascend new heights to see the full breadth and depth of the phenomena. In short it is a beauty and appreciation of חכמה. This sense is employed in Hallacha as the primary criteria of truth as Ramban explains in his introduction to Milchamos Hashem. The Hallachik thinker must survey the totality of the Sugya and choose between different solutions to the problems each with their remaining difficulties. This is a process of שקול הדעת, a weighing in the mind based on the knowledge of Hallachik categories and methodology and the thinker's own sense of which solutions are most in line with beauty, consistency and חכמה. When Tosafos asks a question on Rashi, for instance, they are well aware of the possible answers, but are pointing out the difficulties that Rashi will have to deal with. Every Shita will have difficulties and the real Machlokes is about which is the smoother and more consistent approach based on their שקול הדעת.
I
have seen many try to impress upon others a different beauty of their ideas as a basis for
acceptance, this is more in the
nature of Drush than Hallacha. To be sure there is a place for Drush but it is
a completely different art from Hallachik definition. Much more liberties are
taken in the speculative art of Drush and a slight turn in language may be the
foothold for a rich and elaborate proposition. Not so in Hallacha, every idea
must be shown to be necessary and firmly based in the facts of the Sugya. Drush
is essentially philosophical ideas tied to a source while Hallachik definition
is the explanation of the Hallachik structures themselves. To
put forth an idea with scant Halachik justification but a natural attraction as the basis of a Hallachik Shiur is to
confuse the two and come away with neither. In reality this approach relies not on the beauty of Hallachik structure
but on the impressive feat of tying together many particulars by association,
of creating a grandiose thematic scheme from an idea that leapt fully formed
from the mind of the Maggid. There is no justification or support for the idea
other than that it can be used as an organizational device and it does not
offer a deeper understanding of the Hallachik structures, in fact many times
mental gymnastics and artificial suppositions are required to make everything
fit. This is really the antithesis of proper methodology, making superficial
connections without ever precisely defining any structure. The Shiur is a tour
de force of בקיאות and
imagination but not definition. There is a seductive appeal of feeling that the
area has been covered by finding a commonality to encompass all particulars,
but they do not show a definition of the Hallachik structure. This is not be
confused with the methodology employed in a topical Shiur, like the Rav’s
Yortzeit Shiurim. To the casual observer they may seem similar but their
differences could not be greater. As was mentioned before, regarding science,
the creativity in Hallacha is found in the ability to view the subject from new
viewpoints. Sometimes it is necessary to lay a foundation or to open a new view
in order to see the problems from a different angle. Many times the proper
category of the Hallachik definition is hidden because we are not viewing the
Inyan or Sugya properly and a general concept is needed to focus our attention
on the relevant facts. Only after that preparation can we find the correct
definitions. But the general idea is always developed from the facts of the
Sugya and shown to be a natural idea of the Inyan. Its validation is in the
ability to use it further for precise Hallachik definition. Indeed, often times
Shiurim begin with many wide ranging questions but return to an in depth
analysis of one case to uncover the proper Hallachik category of a Sugya, which
is a true breakthrough opening up whole new ways of looking at the Sugya. One
clear definition in a Rav Chaim can guide the further study of many Gemaras by
showing the foundational concepts in a Sugya. The difference between the two
approaches can be summarized with an allegory. Suppose two men intend to gain
knowledge of the art of healing. One studies all the symptoms and categorizes
them according to their appearances looking for patterns to determine which remedies
are most effective for which ailments, while the other studies the causes of
the symptoms and the health of the body thereby gaining an insight into what
could bring the body back to an equilibrium. While they both will have success
in healing, the approaches are completely at odds. One seeks patterns in the
manifest effects and the other seeks an understanding of the causes. One only
gains a superficial knowledge while the other gains a deeper understanding of
health and sickness.
In sum the careful practitioner of the Derech
comes to the Sugya with a deep familiarity with and knowledge of Hallachik
categorical thinking but refrains from formulating any ideas until the facts of
the Sugya bring them to mind or warrant them. He is wary of positing any unfounded,
preconceived ideas into the Sugya but he is constantly on the alert for clues
to the underlying theory. He defines what he sees to the depth that he can,
happy to gain as much truth as possible, cautiously leaving the rest for
another time. He shuns vague notions that do not yield a deeper understanding
and clings to the words of the Rishonim for guidance.